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clearly demonstrated by the heated nature of the debate concern-
ing the possibility that analog perceptual representations might be 
employed in mental imagery tasks (Pylyshyn, 1973, 1981; Kosslyn 
and Shwartz, 1977). Now, there is general agreement that behavioral 
and neural evidence suggests that mental imagery (Kosslyn, 1994) 
and motor imagery (Jeannerod, 1995; Grèzes and Decety, 2001) 
depend on sensory and motor representations respectively.
Within the last two decades, a growing number of researchers 
and philosophers have argued that cognitive science needs to reo-
rient itself with respect to its fundamental assumptions about the 
nature of mind and cognition. These researchers and philosophers 
contend that cognitive processes need to be viewed as fundamen-
tally based in our bodily interactions with the world. Clark (1998, 
p. 506) expresses this view clearly in his economical assertion that, 
“Biological brains are first and foremost the control systems for 
biological bodies.” The idea is that we cannot hope to understand 
the functioning of the brain without appreciating the central role 
it plays in guiding perception and action. This view has lead to a 
robust and diverse research program in which investigators examine 
the possible ways in which thinking, remembering, and under-
standing language are shaped by the fact that we dynamically inter-
act with our complex physical and social environment by means 
of perceptual and motor capacities (Wilson, 2002). Embodied 
theories of cognition often suggest that concepts are understood 
via sensorimotor simulations. Neural systems that are involved in 
understanding real objects, actions, and events in the world are 
used to internally simulate those objects, actions, and events at 
later points in time.
The TheoreTical promise of embodied concepTs
Within cognitive science, the orthodox approach to concepts views 
them as containing amodal representations. This approach posits 
mental symbols that are manipulated solely based on their syntactic 
properties. By assumption, there is no intrinsic connection between 
these symbols and what they represent. This approach faces a well-
known challenge: the symbol grounding problem. Harnad (1990, 
inTroducTion
In this essay, I propose and defend a new take on a familiar idea. The 
familiar idea is that our concepts are encoded in at least two gen-
eral types of semantic representations: one type that is perception 
and motor based and another that is language based (Paivio, 1971, 
1986). Although most concepts employ both types of representa-
tions, abstract concepts tend to depend more on linguistic repre-
sentations than concrete concepts do. What separates my version 
of this idea from most previous ones is that I develop it within an 
embodied approach to cognition (although see Barsalou et al., 2008; 
Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008 for related yet distinct views).
My defense of this new take has three parts. The first part out-
lines and motivates an embodied approach to concepts based on 
simulation. The second part examines a challenge that faces any 
form of embodied cognition: the problem of abstraction. After 
making the observation that the symbolic structure of language is 
well suited to solving this problem, I propose that language should 
be seen as a form of what I refer to as “dis-embodied” cognition. 
What I mean by this is that linguistic representations are embod-
ied in the neurophysiological sense that they rely on sensorimotor 
simulation but, unlike other embodied forms of cognition, they 
do not inherit semantic content from this fact. They do, however, 
accrue semantic content through their associations and inferential 
relationships with other linguistic representations. The third part 
surveys empirical evidence that supports the existence of separate 
semantic codes.
embodied concepTs
Historically, cognitive scientists have presumed that higher cogni-
tive processes are carried out by computations involving amodal 
mental representations (i.e., representations that are not located 
within a sensorimotor modality). The precise nature of these rep-
resentations was a matter of some debate. For instance, a great deal 
of controversy has surrounded the issue of how language-like they 
might be (Fodor, 1975). The presumption of amodality, however, 
went largely unquestioned. The strength of this presumption was 
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(2005) identifies two distinct strains of embodied cognition – one 
that focuses on affordances and situated action and the other that 
focuses on simulation – and argues that both are true depend-
ing on the context. I am going to limit myself to the simulation 
framework here for a couple of reasons. The first is that I believe 
that this framework is more flexible than critics assume. An unfor-
tunate consequence of Barsalou’s use of the term perceptual symbol 
is that it gives the false impression that simulations are based in 
perception and not in action mechanisms. However, nothing in 
the theory prevents purely motor-based simulations. Perceptual 
symbols are thus compatible with, for example, action schemas 
(Glenberg and Robertson, 1999). The second reason is that I am 
committed to a representational approach to concepts. One of the 
issues that separate different views of embodiment is the status 
of representations. Many proponents of affordances and situated 
action embrace non-representational accounts of cognition – often 
appealing to the promise of dynamical systems theory. Based largely 
on this issue, Clark (1997) distinguishes between embodied cogni-
tive science and radical embodied cognitive science. Clark (1997, 
2008) defends the former while theorists such as Chemero (2009) 
defend the latter. Siding with Clark, I assume that the notion of 
representation is too useful to give up and, furthermore, that an 
empirically successful theory of concepts will involve an appeal to 
representations (Markman and Dietrich, 2000).
A perceptual symbol consists of a neurophysiological re- 
enactment of a collection of sensorimotor representations. It 
can be thought of as having perceptual content because there are 
certain states of affairs in the world that would be likely to elicit 
these representations under normal conditions. Barsalou argues 
that this perceptual content can provide a leg up with regard to 
intentional content. He writes (Barsalou, 1999, p. 597; emphasis 
in the original):
Where perceptual symbols do have an advantage [over amodal 
symbols] is in the ability of their content to play a heuristic role in 
establishing reference. Although perceptual content is rarely defini-
tive for intentionality, it may provide a major source of constraint 
and assistance in determining what a symbol is about.
The general idea is that perceptual symbols help us refer to objects 
and events because they are already causally connected with those 
objects and events. This causal connection does not fully determine 
the conceptual content of a perceptual symbol but it can help secure 
that content.
Although embodied cognition has promise with respect to 
helping with the symbol grounding problem, it seems too early to 
declare victory for two reasons. The first is that it is not clear that 
the problem has been fully solved (Taddeo and Floridi, 2005). The 
second is that other approaches may have the conceptual resources 
to address the problem. Instead of proclaiming that embodiment 
solves this longstanding problem, I am going to make a weaker 
and hopefully less controversial claim: the heuristic role identified 
by Barsalou is an attractive design feature of perceptual symbols. 
A conceptual system containing perceptual symbols can benefit 
from the role that sensorimotor representations play in guiding 
action and perception. To be more precise, I am going to claim 
that this design feature is more beneficial with some concepts than 
it is with others.
p. 335) summarizes this problem with the question, “How can the 
meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on 
the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but 
other meaningless symbols?” Perhaps the easiest way to think of 
this problem is to imagine trying to learn a foreign language from 
a dictionary in that language. Each word would be defined in terms 
of its connections to other words. In order to avoid this problem, 
the meaning of at least some mental symbols must be grounded 
in something other than their syntactic properties.
A key impetus for the hypothesis that concepts are couched in 
sensorimotor representations is the belief that this will help with the 
symbol grounding problem. In order to see just how it might help, 
we need to have a clear conception of what an embodied account 
of concepts might look like. For that reason, I am going to briefly 
sketch what I take to be the strongest and most developed embodied 
accounts of concepts: the perceptual symbol theory (Barsalou, 1999). 
I should emphasize, though, that many of the points made in this 
essay extend beyond this particular theory and do not depend on its 
ultimate success. A core tenet of perceptual symbol system theory is 
that sensorimotor simulations of experience are of central impor-
tance to our concepts. Intuitively, the idea is that our conceptualiza-
tion of a category consists of simulating the experience of perceiving 
and/or acting on exemplars of that category. Such simulations are 
the result of a kind of neurophysiological re-enactment: information 
concerning the neural activation patterns associated with perception 
or action, which has been captured and stored by conjunctive neu-
rons in neighboring association areas or convergence zones (Damasio 
and Damasio, 1994), is used later in absence of relevant input to 
generate a partial reactivation of the sensorimotor representations.
Perceptual symbols have a number of properties that make them 
well suited to serve as conceptual representations (Barsalou, 1999, 
2003). First, simulations need not be conscious – that is, they may 
contain unconscious perceptual representations (for evidence to 
this effect see Pecher et al., 2009). This property removes some of the 
traditional objections to imagistic theories of cognition that turn 
on the unreliability or vagueness of introspection. Second, simula-
tions will often be schematic in the sense they contain only some of 
the sensorimotor representations involved in the experience being 
simulated. For instance, a simulation in the visual modality of the 
concept DOG might involve shape representations but not color 
representations. Third, they will typically be multi-modal in the 
sense that they involve the reactivation of perceptual representations 
in several modalities. Fourth, perceptual symbols provide a novel 
means of drawing the type/token distinction (Barsalou, 1999, 2003). 
This is achieved through distinguishing simulators and  simulations. 
A simulator is a distributed system spanning association and sen-
sorimotor areas. To possess a concept, such as DOG, is to have a 
skill or ability to generate appropriate perceptual representations 
of dogs in a given situation. An innovative aspect of Barsalou’s 
account is that it holds that these simulations are context-sensitive: 
simulations for a given concept vary depending on the context and 
the speaker’s goals. For example, they might represent objects from 
a particular perspective. Typically, simulations will involve only a 
small subset of the information stored in memory.
Although I believe that simulation-based accounts of embodi-
ment have the most empirical promise, I should acknowledge that 
there are other theoretical conceptions of embodiment. Borghi 
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Using a different experimental paradigm, Buccino et al. (2005) 
found that listening to action-related sentences modulated activity 
in the motor system. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded 
from hand and foot muscles were specifically modulated by hand-
related and foot-related action sentences respectively.
More support is provided by the fact that lesions can lead to 
the loss of multiple categories that share perceptual properties 
(Simmons and Barsalou, 2003). For instance, Adolphs et al. (2000) 
found that damage to the somatosensory cortex was correlated with 
deficits in the visual recognition of facial expressions. The authors 
propose that simulation of producing facial expressions is involved 
in the recognition of facial expressions in others. A selective deficit 
in action word processing has been found patients with motor neu-
ron disease (Bak et al., 2001). A word of caution is needed, though, 
because modality-specific damage does not explain the category-
specific deficits of all patients (Caramazza and Mahon, 2006).
A body of brain imaging data support an embodied approach 
to concepts. Martin et al. (1996), for example, found increased 
activation in visual areas with categories that appear to rely heavily 
on visual information for identification. Simmons et al. (2007) find 
evidence of a common neural substrate for color perception and 
verification of object-associated color (e.g., taxi-yellow). Using a 
visual naming task, Chao and Martin (2000) found increased activ-
ity in motor areas with highly manipulable objects when compared 
to less manipulable objects. Hauk et al. (2004) had participants 
read individual words that referred to actions involving leg, arm, 
and head movements such as lick, pick, and kick. They found that 
reading each type of action word produced increased activation 
in successively in the regions of M1 associated with performing 
the relevant movements. In a task where participants listened to 
action-related sentences, Tettamanti et al. (2005) found increased 
activation in effector-specific premotor and motor areas.
In sum, a number of studies using different experimental para-
digms and techniques implicate sensorimotor representations in 
various cognitive tasks. Positing perceptual symbols provides an 
economical and robust explanation for a diverse set of observed 
phenomena, including reaction times, the functional character of 
some neuropathologies, and neural activation patterns in response 
to certain cognitive tasks.
challenges To The evidence
Aside from the problem of abstraction, which will be discussed 
in the next section, the inference to embodied cognition from the 
available evidence faces two major challenges. The first concerns 
how the debate is framed. Machery (2007, 2010) argues that amo-
dal theories are not monolithic, and there are conceivable amodal 
systems that would fit with the available evidence. In a similar vein, 
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) contend that the activity in senso-
riomotor areas observed in many experiments could be the result 
of spreading activation from amodal representations. The ability 
to offer amodal explanations for the available evidence undermines 
some of the hyperbolic rhetoric used by supporters of embodied 
cognition. Too often, such supporters claim that the empirical 
predictions of embodied and amodal approaches sharply diverge. 
What Machery and Mahon and Caramazza demonstrate is that the 
empirical decision between the embodied and amodal approaches 
may be more difficult than some have advertised. This point seems 
empirical evidence
There is little question that embodied cognition has been a produc-
tive research program. New research seems to emerge daily. Due 
to this abundance, I am only going to offer a selective review. My 
purpose is not to be comprehensive but, instead, to provide general 
motivation for an embodied approach to concepts.
A number of behavioral experiments support the notion that 
perceptual representations are central to some cognitive tasks. 
For instance, Pecher et al. (2003) found a modality-switching cost 
in a linguistic task. Participants verified verbally expressed facts 
involving one modality, such as the fact that leaves rustle, more 
rapidly after verifying a fact involving the same modality, such as 
the fact that blenders make noise, than after verifying a fact involv-
ing a different modality, such as the fact that cranberries are tart. 
More recently, van Dantzig et al. (2008) found a similar modality-
switching cost between a perceptual detection task and a property 
verification task. Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) asked participants to 
affirm whether or not pictures depicted the actions described in 
previously presented sentences. The actions had either a vertical or 
horizontal orientation (such as driving a nail into a floor or into a 
wall). Participants responded more quickly to the pictures that had 
the same orientation as the action described. Stanfield and Zwaan 
(2001) suggest that the subjects generated a perceptual image of 
the action described in the sentence and then used this image to 
carry out the affirmation task.
Other behavioral studies demonstrate the degree to which cog-
nitive tasks can be interwoven with action. For instance, Borghi 
et  al. (2004) found a compatibility effect associated with language 
processing and action. Participants were instructed to decide 
whether or not a word that followed a sentence named a part of 
the object mentioned in the sentence. Half of the selected parts were 
found in the upper-portion of the object and half were found in 
the lower-portion. The experimenters found that responses were 
faster when the direction of the key press movement (upward or 
downward) matched the part location (upper or lower). Further 
studies indicate that the motor representations elicited by the cogni-
tive tasks can exhibit somatotopic specificity. For instance, Scorolli 
and Borghi (2007) asked their participants to judge whether or 
not simple sentences containing a verb and a noun were sensible 
or not and respond either by pressing a pedal or speaking into a 
microphone. The verbs in the sentences referred to actions that were 
typically performed with the mouth, hands, or the feet. Response 
times with the microphone were fastest with “mouth-sentences” 
and response times with the pedal were fastest with “foot-sentences” 
(see also Scorolli et al., 2009).
Researchers have produced evidence using transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) that provides compelling support for the 
behavioral findings. Pulvermüller et al. (2005) carried out a TMS 
study in which they found that stimulation over motor areas affects 
action word processing. They weakly stimulated different parts of 
the motor system while participants performed a lexical decision 
task on arm- and leg-related action words. Weak stimulation of left 
hemisphere areas associated with arm-movement led to an increased 
response time with arm-related words in comparison with leg-re-
lated words, and the reverse pattern occurred with weak stimulation 
of motor areas associated with leg-movement. Response times were 
not modulated in a control condition with a sham stimulation. 
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Dove, 2009). This is problematic because, although it is not difficult 
to imagine how embodiment might help us acquire concrete con-
cepts, it is difficult to see how it can be anything but a hindrance with 
abstract concepts such as DEMOCRACY, ELECTRON, ENTROPY, 
JUSTICE, NUMBER, PATIENCE, and TRUTH. Representations 
grounded in sensorimotor systems do not seem to be well suited to 
representing abstract intentional contents. For this reason, abstract 
concepts remain a critical issue for embodied cognition. More is at 
stake than simply the reach of this approach. For instance, Mahon 
and Caramazza (2008, p. 60) use the challenge posed by abstract 
concepts to support a parsimony argument in support of an amodal 
approach to concepts:
Given that an embodied theory of cognition would have to admit 
‘disembodied’ cognitive processes in order to account for the rep-
resentation of abstract concepts, why have a special theory just for 
concepts of concrete objects and actions?
While I am not convinced that such parsimony arguments have 
much force (the history of psychology is rich with highly eco-
nomical failed theories), the core premise of this argument – i.e., 
that abstract concepts require disembodied cognition – needs to 
be examined.
Three embodied approaches To absTracT concepTs
Supporters of embodied concepts have begun to address the prob-
lem of abstraction. Three main approaches exist in the literature 
(for a review see Glenberg et al., 2008). Although each approach 
has some empirical support, there are reasons to believe that 
these approaches do not provide a full solution to the problem 
of abstraction.
The first and most well established approach involves meta-
phoric extension. This approach originally emerged from work 
in cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987). 
The core idea is that we often understand one conceptual domain 
metaphorically in terms of another. Often, these metaphors are 
shaped by image schemas formed from our bodily interactions, 
linguistic experience, and historical context. For instance, the con-
cept of ARGUMENT may be understood in terms of the concept 
of WAR. The primary evidence for this approach is our use of lin-
guistic metaphors. Some recent behavioral studies, though, provide 
evidence of the metaphorical use of space to represent abstract 
concepts. For instance, Boroditsky and colleagues (Boroditsky and 
Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008) provide evidence 
that some temporal judgments rely on spatial representations. 
Richardson et al. (2003) attempted to ascertain whether or not 
comprehending abstract verbs, such as argue and respect, auto-
matically activates spatial image schemas with a specific orientation 
(horizontal for argue and vertical for respect). Participants listened 
to short sentences while engaged in either a visual discrimination 
task or a picture memory task. Reaction times suggest that there 
was an interaction between the horizontal/vertical orientation of 
the image schema and the horizontal/vertical orientation of the 
visual stimuli.
The second approach is similar in spirit to the first but focuses 
on the importance of action schemas (Glenberg and Robertson, 
1999). The core idea of this approach is that some abstract language 
is grounded in motor processes. A primary source of evidence is 
well taken; the issue will ultimately be decided by which approach is 
best supported by the evidence. The defeasible position of this paper 
is that the available evidence favors an embodied approach.
The second challenge is that the neuroimaging evidence does not 
exclude the presence of amodal representations. Indeed, many of the 
cited imaging experiments find modulation of activity in multiple 
brain areas. Several commentators (e.g., Weiskopf, 2007; Chatterjee, 
2010; Machery, 2010) point out that a number of the neuroimag-
ing studies cited in support of embodied cognition actually find 
modulated activity in brain areas that are near – but not identical 
to – areas used for perceptual and motor processing. This is a seri-
ous challenge to a philosophical position known as neo-empiricism 
(Prinz, 2002). A core tenet of this position is that all conceptual 
representations are modality-specific (Machery, 2010). Against this 
universal claim, evidence suggesting that some conceptual represen-
tations are located within areas outside of areas used for perceptual 
and motor processing is damning. It is not clear, though, that such 
evidence undermines a simulation-based embodied approach.
On some level, the distributed activation patterns found in the 
literature fit with the theory of perceptual symbols. Barsalou (2003) 
proposes that long-term memory integration processes underlie the 
ability create appropriate simulations. Such processes are needed to 
explain our ability to generalize and abstract away from particular 
exemplars and generate the right simulations on a given occasion. 
This move offloads significant aspects of conceptualization into 
non-perceptual association areas or convergence zones (Damasio 
and Damasio, 1994). It also raises the question of whether or not 
these areas contain amodal symbols. Barsalou et al. (2003, p. 87) 
concede that “…conjunctive neurons in convergence zones consti-
tute a somewhat amodal mechanism for capturing and re-enacting 
modality-specific states” but then go on to point out that alterna-
tive explanations of the activity of these neurons are available that 
do not require amodal symbols. They then suggest that we should 
pragmatically assume that convergence zones do not contain amo-
dal symbols until evidence suggests otherwise.
This is not a satisfying solution to the challenge posed by acti-
vation in convergence zones because it is provisional and ad hoc. 
Fortunately, there is a better way to meet this challenge: we can 
adopt a more liberal definition of an embodied concept. The fun-
damental intuition behind the embodied approach is that cognition 
is fundamentally integrated with perceptual and motor systems. 
Such integration does not in and of itself exclude supramodal or 
even amodal representations as long as the function of these rep-
resentations is to engage appropriate simulations and not to act as 
independent conceptual representations. I would even go further 
and suggest that the very modal/amodal distinction fits poorly 
with an integrated embodied perspective because it presupposes 
a clean distinction between cognition and perception. From an 
embodied perspective, no such clean distinction exists. If I am right, 
then evidence of relevant neural activity in areas near to, but not 
directly associated with, a particular sensorimotor modality is not 
unequivocally incompatible with an embodied approach.
The problem of absTracTion
A well-known limitation of the evidence for embodied concepts 
is that it primarily involves concrete or highly imageable concepts 
(Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2007; Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008; 
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RESPECT. This ubiquity raises the question of whether a non-
metaphoric understanding of the target concept is needed to anchor 
these metaphoric uses.
Although the action schema approach is similar in spirit to 
the metaphorical projection approach, it enjoys some advantages 
over the metaphorical projection approach. For one, the evidence 
offered in support of this approach seems more substantial and less 
equivocal. Second, the developmental picture behind this approach 
seems more plausible. It fits with the developmental evidence sug-
gesting that concrete or highly imageable event words are easier 
for young children to acquire than abstract ones (Maguire and 
Dove, 2008). Despite these advantages, the action schema approach 
faces some of the same challenges as the metaphoric projection 
approach. For instance, the apparent representational flexibility of 
action schemas raises the question of how it is possible to acquire 
the relevant abstract concepts. If the same action schema underlies 
various concepts, how are the differences between these concepts 
represented? Another problem is that it is difficult to imagine how 
action schemas can account for all abstract concepts. For instance, 
it is not clear how they might handle concepts such as ELECTRON, 
NUMBER, and TRUTH.
Finally, consider the situated simulation approach. The 
body of evidence cited in support of it is admittedly quite thin. 
More importantly, this evidence may not resolve the issue of 
the embodiment of conceptual representations. A supporter of 
amodal symbols could well argue that disembodied symbols 
are needed to account for our ability to represent the social 
and relational aspects of situations. In the end, the most seri-
ous problem facing the situated simulations proposal is that a 
particular abstract concept such as DEMOCRACY is not likely 
to be associated with a simple set of sensorimotor experiences 
(Dove, 2009).
In sum, current attempts to offer an embodied solution to the 
problem of abstraction appear suffer from two weaknesses: insuf-
ficiency and incompleteness. The approaches appear to be insuffi-
cient because they do not provide a full explanation of the concepts 
to which they apply. They appear incomplete because they do not 
seem to capture all abstract concepts. This is not to say that these 
proposals have no merit. Instead, I suggest that each has some 
promise and empirical support, but, ultimately, more is needed to 
explain our ability to abstract and generalize.
dis-embodimenT
Supporters of an embodied approach to concepts tend to treat the 
problem of abstraction as a collection of exceptions. The task then 
becomes to explain a subset of these exceptions using the theoretical 
techniques and experimental designs of the research program of 
embodied cognition. This effort ignores the fact that abstraction 
represents a general problem for embodied concepts. What we need 
to explain is our ability to go beyond embodied experience. Earlier 
we emphasized how grounding our concepts in action and percep-
tion systems may help us acquire conceptual content. Now, we need 
to acknowledge that such grounding has potential costs associated 
with it. In particular, sensorimotor simulations seem ill-suited for 
representing conceptual content that is not closely tied to particular 
experiences. The problem is that some concepts appear to require 
what we might call ungrounded representations.
the action–sentence compatibility effect or ACE (Glenberg and 
Kaschak, 2002). Glenberg and Kaschak found that reaction times 
decreased when response direction (a button press either away/
toward the body) and the implied direction of either concrete action 
sentences (e.g., Andy gave you the pizza/You gave Andy the pizza) 
or abstract transfer sentences (e.g., Liz told you a story/You told Liz 
a story) matched. They suggest that the ACE is the result of com-
petition for resources by the motor planning associated with the 
action and the language processing associated with the sentence. 
Adding to the behavioral research, Glenberg et al. (2008) recently 
provide neurophysiological evidence that comprehension of both 
object-transfer and abstract-transfer sentences modulates motor 
system activity.
The third approach proposes that, contrary to our intuitions, 
some abstract concepts involve situated simulations (Barsalou, 
1999). This approach is supported by evidence from feature gen-
eration experiments. In a preliminary study, Barsalou and Wiemer-
Hastings (2005) asked participants to generate typical properties for 
three abstract concepts (TRUTH, FREEDOM, and INVENTION), 
three concrete concepts (BIRD, CAR, and SOFA) and three inter-
mediate concepts (COOKING, FARMING, and CARPETING). 
The authors report two core findings: that participants generated 
situational properties with both concrete and abstract concepts and 
that participants tended to generate more event and introspective 
properties with abstract concepts. They propose that abstract and 
concrete concepts are generally associated with different aspects of 
situations: abstract concepts tend to focus on social aspects while 
concrete concepts tend to focus on physical entities and actions. In 
a more fully realized experiment employing similar methodology, 
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) found that participants tended 
to produce fewer entity properties, more introspective properties, 
and more relational properties with abstract concepts than with 
concrete concepts.
How promising are these approaches? Let us consider each 
in turn. There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of meta-
phorical projection solution to the problem of abstraction. First, 
there are reasons to question the force of the linguistic evidence 
supporting this approach. It is just not clear that such linguistic 
patterns directly reflect conceptual structure. Indeed, alternative 
explanations of metaphors that do not require positing metaphoric 
representations are available (Murphy, 1997). Another problem is 
that this proposal seems developmentally implausible (Murphy, 
1996). For example, it seems unlikely that an understanding of the 
complexities of war is required for the acquisition of the concept 
of an argument. Furthermore, evidence suggests that children’s 
understanding of metaphor remains quite poor before the ages of 
8–10 (Winner et al., 1976). Finally, there is an inherent difficulty 
faced by the attempt to capture conceptual content in terms of 
metaphor: while a metaphor enables us to highlight the similarities 
between two concepts, it cannot capture the important differences. 
Arguments, after all, are not really wars. Recognizing the appro-
priate connections between a perceptual experience and what it is 
being metaphorically extended to cover seems to require a prior 
understanding of the concept. Without such an understanding, it 
is difficult to see how one can arrive at a correct interpretation of 
a metaphor. The very ubiquity of spatial metaphor undermines 
its potential for representing a specific abstract concept such as 
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held up as a paradigmatic example of an amodal symbol system. 
Three design features are particularly important. The first is the 
inherent representational arbitrariness of words and morphemes. 
There is, for example, no intrinsic similarity or other extralinguistic 
connection of the English word cat to the category of cats. Indeed, 
other languages associate phonetically and graphemically different 
words with the same category. Furthermore, the phonemic similar-
ity of cat to cap carries no weight with respect to the contents of 
these words. The second is its stimulus-independence (Chomsky, 
1966). Competent speakers are able to produce linguistic utterances 
in a self-generated fashion that is not an immediate response to 
proximal environmental stimulation. The third is its systematicity 
(Fodor, 1975; Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker, 1994). The ability 
to produce a sentence such as Joni loves Chachi seems to come hand 
in hand with the ability to form other sentences such as Chachi 
loves Joni and Jenny loves Chachi, etc. A common explanation of 
these design features is that natural language amounts to a syntacti-
cally recombinable symbol system. While there are disagreements 
concerning the cognitive architecture that underlies our linguistic 
competence, a large body of linguistic research suggests that the 
morphosyntactic structure of language is at least characterizable 
in terms of a productive grammar.
Now the mere fact that natural language is stimulus-independ-
ent and systematic does not sufficiently distinguish it from garden 
variety perceptual symbols. One of the achievements of perceptual 
symbol theory is that it demonstrates how a simulation-based sym-
bol system might have these properties (Barsalou and Prinz, 1997). 
Stimulus-independence and systematicity alone cannot establish an 
advantage of verbal over non-verbal representations with respect to 
abstract contents. Natural language must bring something else to 
the table. In a philosophical exploration of possible conceptions of 
animal and human cognition, Camp (2009) suggests that we should 
view stimulus-independence and recombinability as degree proper-
ties. She then argues that natural language enhances these features 
in at least four ways. First, natural language is likely to increase the 
range of thoughts that any one individual may entertain because it 
enables one to hear the thoughts of others. Second, natural language 
makes it easier to reproduce the same thought in different situa-
tions because of its lack of context-sensitivity. Third, the manifest 
syntactic structure of natural language highlights the potential 
recombinality of thoughts and thus encourages us to entertain a 
wider of thoughts. Finally, natural language provides a sufficiently 
rich expressive medium to allow one to represent truth-values and 
inferential relations among thoughts. These enhancements mean 
that a creature with language is likely to enjoy a general cognitive 
advantage over a creature that does not.
A primary benefit afforded by a natural language is that it 
provides a representational system that can play the integrative 
role traditionally associated with amodal symbols. Consider the 
following argument for the necessity of amodal representations. 
After recognizing the existence of independent sensorimotor codes, 
Jackendoff (1992, p. 3) contends that amodal representations are 
necessary because “…none of these forms of input and output 
information suffices to explain the way that we understand the 
world in terms of objects, their motions, our actions on them, 
and so forth.” The general idea is that amodal representations are 
needed to capture generalizations about entities and events that 
The orthodox position within cognitive science, clearly expressed 
in the quote from Mahon and Caramazza given above, is that such 
“disembodied” concepts require amodal representations. If we look 
at the general features of the proposed embodied solutions to the 
problem of abstraction – particularly the metaphor projection 
and action schema approaches – a different theoretical possibil-
ity emerges. Each of these approaches proposes ways in which 
embodied representations associated with a certain experiential/
cognitive domain can be used to refer to objects and events out-
side of that domain. To capture this idea, I am going coin a new 
term: dis-embodiment. A mental symbol is dis-embodied if (1) it 
is embodied but (2) this embodiment is arbitrarily related to its 
semantic content. In other words, a mental symbol is dis-embodied 
if it involves sensorimotor simulations of experiences that are not 
associated with its semantic content. The dash in the middle of this 
term is intended to distinguish this notion from the more general 
notion of disembodiment to which Mahon and Caramazza appeal. 
What I want to suggest is that the proposals outlined above are on 
the right track, but they fail to provide a general solution to the 
problem of abstraction. Below, I argue that natural language itself 
serves as a form of dis-embodied cognition and plays an extensive 
role in enabling us to acquire and use abstract concepts.
language as a form of dis-embodied cogniTion
One way to approach the problem of abstraction is to scrutinize 
the abstract/concrete distinction (Scorolli, 2009). A number of 
researchers suggest that there are qualitative differences between 
abstract and concrete concepts. For example, Barr and Caplan 
(1987) propose that a meaningful distinction can be drawn between 
categories that are primarily represented by “extrinsic” features 
(those associated with relations between two or more entities) and 
those that are represented by “intrinsic” features (those associated 
with individual entities). Based on property generation studies, 
Wiemer-Hastings and Xu (2005) propose a two-factor account 
in which abstract concepts are both less contextually specific and 
predominately associated with social aspects of situations. Crutch 
and Warrington (2005) propose a qualitative distinction in which 
concrete concepts are organized primarily around similarity and 
abstract concepts are organized around semantic association. A 
recent eye-tracking experiment suggests that these representational 
differences emerge during on-line word-recognition (Deñabeitia 
et al., 2009). Participants were presented with visual displays that 
included a target picture of item that was a semantic associate of 
an abstract or concrete word. Their eye-movements were recorded 
as they listened to the relevant words. They tended to fixate more 
(and earlier) on depicted objects that were associates of abstract 
words than associates of concrete words. Overall, evidence of a 
qualitative distinction between abstract and concrete concepts is 
growing. What is the source of this distinction? I propose that it 
arises from an asymmetry between the types of representations 
employed by abstract and concrete concepts. While concrete 
concepts generally depend on both linguistic and non-linguistic 
perceptual symbols, abstract concepts tend to rely primarily on 
linguistic perceptual symbols.
Natural language has a number of design features commonly 
associated with amodal symbol systems that make it well suited to 
representing abstract concepts. Indeed, natural language is often 
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to consist of embodied representations grounded in action and 
perception mechanisms. Glenberg et al. (2008, p. 4) offer the fol-
lowing summary of what researchers mean when they say that 
language is embodied:
Linguistic symbols are embodied to the extent that: (a) the meaning 
of the symbol (the interpretant) to the agent depends on activity 
in systems also used for perception, action, and emotion, and (b) 
reasoning about meaning, including combinatorial processes of 
sentence understanding requires use of those systems.
The idea is that linguistic symbols have meaning because they 
dynamically activate sensorimotor representations associated with 
interacting with the world. On this account, linguistic symbols are 
intermediaries that do not directly have meaning or participate in 
reasoning about meaning.
I suggest that language plays two roles in our cognitive lives. 
One role is to engage sensorimotor simulations of interacting with 
the world. In this role, language serves primarily as a medium of 
communication. A second role is to elicit and engage symbolically 
mediated associations and inferences. Our concepts are not merely 
couched in sensorimotor representations but also in linguistic 
representations (words, phrases, sentences). Conceptual content 
is captured in part by the relationships of linguistic representations 
with other linguistic representations. These relationships may be 
merely associative or they may be inferential. On this view, a con-
cept such as DOG will, not only be represented on a given occasion 
by multimodal simulations associated with interacting with dogs, 
but will also be represented in terms of related linguistic words, 
phrases, or sentences. This idea has a clear affinity with inferential 
role or conceptual role semantics (Harman, 1982; Block, 1986). This 
philosophical theory of mental content holds that the meaning of a 
concept is determined by its functional role within the cognitive life 
of an individual. My proposal is distinct from this theory because 
it adds the further requirement that the associative and inferential 
relationships be couched in language-based simulations.
One source of evidence for the view that internalized natu-
ral language can itself serve as a symbolic form of cognition is 
the effectiveness of statistical models that derive the meaning of 
words through statistical computations applied to large corpuses 
of text (Louwerse and Jeuniaux, 2008). A prominent example of 
this type of model is Latent Semantic Analysis or LSA (Landauer 
and Dumais, 1997). The idea behind LSA is that the aggregate of 
all the linguistic contexts in which a given word does and does 
not appear constrains semantic-relatedness. LSA has shown some 
effectiveness with respect to modeling a variety of linguistic tasks 
(Landauer et al., 1998). For example, an LSA model performed at 
a comparable level on the vocabulary portion of the Test of English 
as a Foreign Language to a large sample of students applying for 
college entrance in the United States from non-English speaking 
countries (Landauer and Dumais, 1997). Even if we grant that this 
particular model is psychologically implausible, it demonstrates the 
potential of a language-based representational system.
TheoreTical influences
I propose that our concepts are encoded in at least two types of 
semantic representations: one type employing embodied sensori-
motor representations associated with our experience of the world 
go beyond the information contained within specific modalities. 
Amodal representations provide a means of gathering and integrat-
ing information from different modalities as well as transferring 
information between distinct sensorimotor codes. Because linguis-
tic representations have the design features outlined above, they 
can also carry out this function (Carruthers, 2002).
I propose that when an individual acquires a natural language, 
she acquires a representational system that is different in some 
important respects from the multimodal, context-sensitive embod-
ied symbol systems that exist independently of language. The acqui-
sition of natural language, in other words, enhances and extends 
her representational abilities by giving her access to a context-free 
and arbitrary symbol system. This symbol system is independent 
of, and yet interacts with, other embodied symbols.
This proposal requires a revisionist conception of linguistic com-
petence. Standard theories of linguistic competence are thoroughly 
amodal. Linguists have identified structural regularities at several 
levels of analysis, including phonology, morphology, syntax, and to 
some degree logical form or semantics. Knowledge relating to these 
levels is thought to be contained with language-specific functional 
modules (Fodor, 1983) and is generally thought to be couched 
in amodal codes. Comprehension involves translating perceptual 
information into these codes and production involves translating 
information in these codes into motor representations. The revi-
sionist approach taken in this essay is that the process of achieving 
competence in a specific natural language involves acquiring the 
ability to generate appropriate simulations of linguistic experience. 
To be successful, these simulations must comport with the struc-
tural regularities at the different levels of analysis. They will not, 
however, depend on knowledge contained with an amodal symbol 
system. Three points about this revisionist proposal are especially 
important. The first is that it is neutral with respect to the issue 
of the degree to which linguistic competence is innate or learned. 
This proposal has to do with the format of the representations 
associated with this competence and not how it is acquired. The 
second is that, despite superficial appearances, this is not an inner 
speech view. The claim is that linguistic competence is contained 
within a system for generating perceptual symbols. These symbols 
consist of neurophysiological simulations that can be partial, selec-
tive, and unconscious. The third important point is that there is no 
independent lexical semantic code. The core thesis of this paper is 
that concepts are couched in two types of simulation-based repre-
sentations: those associated with non-linguistic experience of the 
world and those associated with experience of language. Because 
simulations are detailed and often complex, linguistic perceptual 
symbols may exhibit structure at the various levels of analysis (pho-
nology, morphology, syntax, etc.).
Thinking in words
Despite the clear differences between embodied and orthodox 
approaches to cognition, both adopt a similar view of the relation-
ship between language and thought. Both see language as a medium 
of communication rather than a medium of thought. According to 
both, language expresses underlying thoughts that are encoded in 
some other semantic code. Within traditional cognitive science, this 
code is typically taken to be a language-like amodal symbol system 
(Fodor, 1975). Within embodied cognition, this code is thought 
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causal relationship with objects and events. Clark (2008) argues 
that language helps extend our cognitive abilities in at least three 
distinct but related ways: first, the very act of labeling objects and 
events provides a means of discovering increasingly abstract pat-
terns in nature; second, the ability to recall and react to structured 
sentences enables us to acquire new skills and capacities, and third, 
our language abilities partially underwrite our ability to reflect 
on and influence the contents of our own thinking. Because he 
is primarily interested in simply establishing that language can in 
fact extend our cognitive abilities, Clark focuses on a collection of 
empirically based examples that seem to demonstrate cognitive 
extension. One of the most established of these is the apparent way 
in which verbal counting helps children acquire an understanding 
of positive integers (Dehaene, 1999; Carey and Sarnecka, 2006).
Where my account diverges from Clark’s is with respect to 
scope. I contend that the sort of scaffolding he discusses is not 
limited to specific concepts or cognitive domains. Instead, acquir-
ing a natural language extends our abilities to acquire concepts 
across the board. This is not simply because it offers a means of 
accessing socially derived information but also because it offers new 
representational powers. I suggest that most concepts depend to 
some significant degree on information represented in internalized 
natural language.
Clark may or may not be sympathetic with this general point, but 
there is no indication that he connects this scaffolding effect to the 
qualitative distinction between abstract and concrete concepts.
This brings us to perhaps the single greatest influence of the 
theory outlined in this essay: Dual Coding Theory or DCT (Paivio, 
1986). This theory posits two independent cognitive subsystems, 
one employing symbolic verbal representations and the other 
employing analog non-verbal representations. Sadoski and Paivio 
(2004, p. 1340) write:
A basic premise of DCT is that all mental representations retain some 
of the concrete qualities of the external experiences from which they 
derive. These experiences can be linguistic or non-linguistic. Their 
different characteristics develop into two separate mental systems, 
or codes, one specialized for representing and processing language 
(the verbal code) and one for processing non-linguistic objects and 
events (the non-verbal code).
The focus in DCT on the dynamic relationship between experi-
ence and mental representations seems to be in keeping with the 
basic tenets of embodied cognition. One might even reasonably 
see DCT as a precursor to the embodied cognition movement. 
However, an important aspect of DCT, i.e., its emphasis on lan-
guage as an independent symbol system, has not generally been 
taken up by embodied cognition. To a certain degree, my account 
can be seen as an attempt to recapture an important insight from 
DCT within an embodied framework. It is important, however, to 
recognize that the result of this effort is not simply a recapitula-
tion of DCT. There are some important differences between the 
account developed here and DCT. First, DCT claims that mental 
images are the basic constituents of the verbal and non-verbal 
systems. My account views perceptual symbols as the basic units. 
This is significant because perceptual symbol system theory rep-
resents an explicit attempt to avoid the weaknesses associated with 
image-based theories of concepts. Perceptual symbols differ from 
and the other type employing dis-embodied sensorimotor repre-
sentations associated with our experience of language. Other types 
may exist. Gesture, for instance, might form an independent seman-
tic representational system (Goldin-Meadow, 2003). This pluralistic 
embodied proposal has clear similarities with some previous theo-
ries. Highlighting the similarities – and the differences – between it 
and these theories should help clarify its central claims.
This proposal overlaps somewhat with another recent attempt to 
offer an embodied solution to the problem of abstraction. Borghi 
and Cimatti (2009) argue that supporters of embodied cognition 
have paid too little attention to the embodied social experience 
associated with language. They propose that there is a qualitative 
distinction to be made, not between two different mental processes, 
but rather between two different cognitive sources of grounding: 
one that depends crucially on direct sensorimotor experience and 
another that depends crucially on linguistic experience. Both of 
these sources can be useful in the acquisition of any concept but the 
acquisition of concrete concepts is likely to depend more on direct 
sensorimotor experience and the acquisition of abstract concepts 
is more likely to depend on linguistic experience. This distinction 
seems important and necessary. I suggest that it falls short, however, 
because it does not appropriately emphasize the importance of 
the computational properties of natural language. While I agree 
that linguistic experience is an important source of socially derived 
information about the world, I maintain that the structural proper-
ties of natural language contribute to its effectiveness in represent-
ing abstract concepts. My account differs from Borghi and Cimatti’s 
because it holds that the acquisition of language creates a new 
dis-embodied semantic system, one that has many of the proper-
ties usually associated with the amodal symbol systems favored by 
traditional cognitive science. In other words, natural language on 
my view is not merely another source of information about the 
world but is also another way of thinking about the world.
My core thesis is that language is an internalized amodal symbol 
system that is built on an embodied substrate. As such, it extends 
our cognitive reach and helps us overcome the problem of abstrac-
tion. This idea is inspired in part by Andy Clark’s view of language 
as a kind of cognitive scaffolding that provides cognitive benefits 
that would not otherwise be available to us. Clark (2008, p. 47) 
summarizes these benefits in the following passage:
The computational value of a public system of essentially context-
free, arbitrary symbols, lies… in the way such a system can push, 
pull, tweak, cajole, and eventually cooperate with various non-
arbitrary, modality-rich, context-sensitive forms of biologically 
basic encoding.
Clark’s claim is that natural language augments the cognitive abili-
ties of an embodied mind. The core idea is that natural language 
is a cognitively useful symbol system, not because it mirrors the 
structure of our underlying thoughts, but because it does not. Clark 
makes much of the arbitrariness of linguistic symbols. Although the 
arbitrariness of the relationship between words and their seman-
tic contents is well known, one might think that “forms of bio-
logically basic encoding” are equally arbitrary. However, as we saw 
above in the context of the symbol grounding problem, there is a 
sense in which perceptual symbols are not arbitrary because they 
contain sensorimotor representations that enjoy a non-cognitive 
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 grammatical deficits are associated with damage throughout 
the left  perisylvian cortex (Caplan et al., 1996). Finally, recent 
evidence suggests that Broca’s area itself might have multiple 
functions. For example, a number have studies have implicated 
in action-related tasks (Thoenissen et al., 2002; Nishitani et al., 
2005). In sum, evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neu-
ropsychology suggests that language processing is widely dis-
tributed in the brain and involves a number of sensorimotor 
areas. Although this distribution is not logically incompatible 
with an amodal approach, it fits well with the idea that language 
processing involves sensorimotor simulations.
A second, more direct reason to think that language process-
ing might involve perceptual symbols is that there is evidence 
of functional links between motor and perception circuits with 
the left perisylvian cortex (Pulvermüller, 2005). For example, 
there is evidence that listening to speech modulates tongue 
muscle responses (Fadiga et al., 2002). This sort of evidence is 
often seen as supporting the motor theory of speech percep-
tion (Liberman and Whalen, 2000) or the direct realist theory 
(Fowler et al., 2003). Critics of these theories argue that auditory 
areas alone might be sufficient for perceiving speech (e.g., Toni 
et al., 2008). If true, this would rule out a strongly action-based 
account of speech perception in which speech perception nec-
essarily involves motor processing. However, it does not rule 
out a weaker view that speech recognition generally involves 
multimodal perceptual symbols.
A third reason to suppose that language processing involves per-
ceptual symbols is that several studies implicate active integration 
of multimodal information in on-line language processing. It is 
well established that visual input can influence phonemic speech-
processing (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976). A large body of eye-
tracking experiments shows the manifold ways in which visual 
information can be continuously integrated with auditory infor-
mation during the processing of speech (Spivey and Richardson, 
2009). Visual information has been shown to influence language 
comprehension at various levels of linguistic analysis, including 
word-recognition (Allopenna et al., 1998), syntactic processing 
(Tanenhaus et al., 1995), and thematic role assignment (Altmann 
and Kamide, 1999). Consider a study involving syntactic ambigu-
ity (Spivey et al., 2002; Spivey and Richardson, 2009). Participants 
were presented with a four-quadrant display of real objects and 
instructed to carry out actions. The display on one condition con-
tained (going clockwise from the upper left quadrant) a spoon 
on a napkin, a bare napkin, a bowl, and a pen. The participants 
were instructed to “Put the spoon on the napkin in the bowl.” 
Eye-tracking evidence indicates that subjects often fixate on the 
irrelevant bare napkin before fixating on the bowl and carrying 
out the action. This suggests that they initially misparse the initial 
prepositional phrase as syntactically attached to the verb. This effect 
did not occur with a similar display in which two spoons appear, 
one on a napkin and one not on a napkin (replacing the pen in 
the earlier display).
A fourth reason to think that language processing might involve 
perceptual symbols is the employment of perceptual areas in lan-
guage processing among people with congenital perceptual defi-
cits. For example, neuroimaging studies find increased activation 
in auditory areas when congenitally deaf individuals view signs 
mental images in a number of important ways: for instance, they 
need not be conscious, they can be schematic, and they are often 
multi-modal. Second, DCT and my theory differ with respect to 
the nature of the mental representations associated with language. 
According to DCT, they are a special class of mental images that 
are made up from different basic elements (logogens) than the 
basic elements of non-verbal representations (imagens). On my 
account, all conceptual representations consist of perceptual 
symbols. Linguistic representations are distinguished form non-
linguistic ones by the fact that they are an internalization of an 
external symbol system.
In the end, the view advocated in this essay brings together ideas 
from a number of different theories and combines them in a novel 
way. While it clearly owes a debt to these previous views, it stands 
or falls on its own.
empirical evidence
We began the last section with the acknowledgment of the seri-
ousness of the problem of abstraction. We now have a theoretical 
picture of how language might help explain this ability: language 
might extend our cognitive abilities in such a way that enables us 
to have some of the benefits of an amodal symbol system. This 
theoretical picture rests on two independent hypotheses: (1) that 
language processing involves sensorimotor simulation and (2) that 
linguistic representations play an important role in our ability to 
abstract and generalize.
language processing involves percepTual symbols
Given the dynamic nature of linguistic communication, the idea 
that language processing involves perceptual symbols seems attrac-
tive. After all, most linguistic communication is time-constrained 
and would seem to require the integration of action, perception, 
and cognition. Below, I survey some of the evidence favoring 
this hypothesis.
The first reason to think language processing might involve 
sensorimotor simulations is a negative one: the project to locate 
self-contained language areas of the brain has not succeeded. 
Ever since the work of Broca and Wernicke in the late nineteenth 
century (Finger, 1994), the classical localizationist position has 
been that subcomponents of language are represented and proc-
essed in bounded and specialized cortical regions (Geschwind, 
1970). One of the primary sources of evidence for this perspec-
tive has been the study of aphasic syndromes resulting from 
focal brain injuries (for a review see Saffran, 2000). Researchers, 
however, have begun to move away from strict localization and 
toward the view that language requires the activity of a number 
of spatially distinct brain regions. This shift has occurred in 
response to several forms of evidence. For one, neuroimaging 
studies indicate that widely distributed brain areas are active 
in language processing (Posner and Raichle, 1994). Another 
reason for this shift is the fact that the association of gram-
matical processing with Broca’s area has broken down to a large 
degree (Grodzinsky, 2000). For instance, there is evidence of 
some retained grammatical knowledge in Broca’s aphasics (Bates 
and Wulfeck, 1989; Bates et al., 1991). In addition, grammati-
cal deficits have been found in Wernicke’s aphasics and other 
clinical populations (Dick et al., 2001). It also appears that 
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highly imageable words have greater contextual information stored 
in semantic memory, and imageability effects are to be explained by 
the facilitation of processing associated with increased activation 
in these networks. On this approach, the reason that participants 
respond more quickly in a lexical decision task to a word such as 
“fingertip” than to one such as “idea” is that the former has more 
semantic associations than the latter.
Evidence suggests that both theories are right, depending on the 
task. I am going to focus on the evidence for the DCT because this 
evidence has more relevance to the claims in this essay.
Consider first neuropsychological case studies. Several research 
teams describe aphasic patients with significant left hemisphere 
damage who exhibit a selective semantic impairment for high 
imageable words (Berndt et al., 2002; Bird et al., 2003; Crepaldi 
et al., 2006). Patients with a selective semantic impairment for 
low imageable words are less common but have also been found 
(Marshall et al., 1996; Luzzatti et al., 2002). This double dissocia-
tion suggests that, at least at some level, the semantic processing of 
concepts with low imageability is functionally independent from 
the semantic processing of concepts with high imageability.
A number of event-related potential (ERP) experiments sup-
port a neuroanatomical distinction between concepts of high and 
low imageability. For instance, Holcomb et al. (1999) created a task 
that involved manipulations of both context and concreteness. 
ERP recordings were time-locked to sentence-final words in a 
word-by-word reading task in which participants made semantic 
congruency judgments (e.g., Armed robbery implies that the thief 
used a weapon vs. armed robbery implies that the thief used a 
rose). They found that sentence-final concrete words generated 
a larger and more anterior N400 than sentence-final abstract 
words in both contexts (see also Kounios and Holcomb, 1994; 
West and Holcomb, 2000). Further studies have found context-
independent topographic effects associated with imageability in 
single-word presentations (Kellenbach et al., 2002; Swaab et al., 
2002). Using two-word stimuli that involved a noun preceded by 
either a concrete modifier or an abstract modifier (“green book” 
vs. “engaging book”) in a visual half-field presentation, Huang 
et al. (2010) found distinct hemispheric responses. Thus, ERP 
studies employing diverse tasks support the notion that different 
cognitive systems are associated with the semantic processing of 
high and low imageable words.
Neuroimaging data supports the notion that neural activity is 
modulated by imageability. A number of studies find that abstract 
or low imageable words elicit greater activation than concrete 
or high imageable words in superior regions of the left tempo-
ral lobe (Mellet et al., 1998; Giesbrecht et al., 2004; Noppeney 
and Price, 2004; Binder et al., 2005; Sabsevitz et al., 2005) and 
inferior regions of the left prefrontal cortex (Giesbrecht et al., 
2004; Noppeney and Price, 2004; Binder et al., 2005; Sabsevitz 
et al., 2005; Goldberg et al., 2006). This evidence fits with imag-
ing studies that implicate the left inferior frontal gyrus or IFG in 
language processing (Bookheimer, 2002). When researchers make 
the comparison in the reverse direction, the pattern is less clear. 
Whereas some studies find no areas of increased activation (Kiehl 
et al., 1999; Perani et al., 1999; Tyler et al., 2001; Grossman et al., 
2002; Noppeney and Price, 2004), others find increased  activation 
in right hemisphere areas (Mellet et al., 1998; Jessen et al., 2000; 
(Petito et al., 2000). Similarly, some primary visual areas show 
increased activation when congenitally blind individuals read 
Braille (Sadato et al., 1996).
Taken together, these various bodies of evidence suggest that 
language processing is much more integrated with action and 
perception systems than was previously assumed by research-
ers. It should be acknowledged, however, that this evidence is 
only suggestive and not conclusive. One could maintain that this 
evidence does not falsify the hypothesis that language process-
ing is handled by amodal symbols since the implicated activ-
ity in sensorimotor systems could be associated with spreading 
activation and not be constitutive of language processing. As I 
mentioned earlier in the essay, this is a general problem faced by 
any embodied hypothesis. Ultimately, the issue is an empirical 
one, and unfortunately the evidence currently available does not 
completely settle matters.
Given this uncertainty, it seems worthwhile to consider what 
would happen if it turns out that language processing is indeed 
handled by an amodal symbol system of the sort posited by the 
current orthodoxy. This would turn the hypothesis that language is 
a form of dis-embodied cognition into the hypothesis that language 
is a form of disembodied cognition (non-hyphenated). It would 
result in a different kind of hybrid theory, one in which concepts are 
represented by both multimodal perceptual symbols and amodal 
linguistic symbols. Although I am promoting the dis-embodied 
view in this essay, the second view is an intriguing and compelling 
alternative (for general arguments in favor of a hybrid approach 
see Dove, 2009; Kemmerer, 2010).
imageabiliTy reconsidered
Imageability effects provide support for the account developed in 
this essay. Typically, imageability is defined as the ease with which 
a word gives rise to a sensory-motor mental image (Paivio, 1971). 
Imageability is a broader concept than concreteness because it 
includes sensory images of bodily states and motor images. It 
is generally recognized that imageability better captures the rel-
evant phenomena and supports broader generalizations. Highly 
reliable imageability ratings on number scales have been gathered 
for linguistic concepts by number of researchers (Toglia and 
Battig, 1978; Bird et al., 2001). Traditionally, cognitive scientists 
examined imageability in terms of processing advantages for high 
imageable concepts over low imageable ones in several cognitive 
tasks. For instance, lexical access has been shown to be quicker for 
highly imageable words than for abstract ones (Coltheart et al., 
1980) and highly imageable words are recalled more quickly in 
memory tasks than abstract words (Paivio, 1986; Wattenmaker 
and Shoben, 1987).
Two major theories dominate the literature: the DCT (Paivio, 
1971, 1986) and the context-availability theory (Schwanenflugel 
and Shoben, 1983). According to the DCT, words with low image-
ability are associated primarily with verbal representations while 
highly imageable words are associated with both verbal representa-
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